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Plaintiff/ Appellant/Cross-Appellee Charles C. Rehn ("Rehn"), by through his 
counsel, respectfully submits this Opening Brief. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN.§ 78A-4-
103(2)G). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
ISSUE 1: Whether the trial court erred in refusing to extend Utah's Reciprocal 
Attorney fees Statute (UT AH CODE ANN. § 78B-5-826) to situations wherein a Defendant 
asserts the enforceability of a contract as a defense to a tort claim and alleges a right to 
recover attorney fees as a result of the enforceability of that contract, and the Plaintiff 
thereafter prevails on the tort claim and defeats the Defendant's contract defense. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This Court reviews the trial court's decision 
regarding a prevailing party's statutory right to recover attorney fees for correctness as a 
matter of law. Insight Assets, Inc. v. Farias, 2013 UT 47, il 8; Bilanzich v. Lonetti, 2007 
UT 26, il 8. Utah's Appellate Courts afford "no deference to the district court's legal 
conclusions." State v. Gallegos, 2007 UT 81, iI 8. This Court can review a trial's court 
decision regarding an abuse of discretion. 
ISSUE 2: Whether the trial court erred in failing to consider an attorney's malicious 
falsification and recording of a lien against his own client's property, and that attorney's 
subsequent attempt to use litigation to force that client into capitulating to paying off the 
falsified lien, as factors in determining whether to issue an equitable award of attorney fees 
to the victim of the attorney's malice. 
1 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW: This Court reviews the trial court's decision 
regarding an equitable award of attorney fees for an abuse of discretion. Hughes v. 
Cafferty, 2004 UT 22, ~ 20. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-5-826 is directly at issue in this appeal. The text of this 
rule is attached as Addendum 1. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the trial court's Ruling, Final Judgment, and Order denying 
Trial Court Plaintiff Rehn's motion for attorney fees against Defendants Steve S. 
Christensen ("Mr. Christensen"), Steve S. Christensen, P .C. ("SSC"), Henroid Nielsen & 
Christensen, Christensen ("HNC"), Christensen, Corbett & Pankratz, PLLC ("CCP"), and 
Hirschi Christensen, PLLC's ("HC") (collectively, "Christensen"). Copies of the Final 
Judgment and Order are attached as Addenda 2 and 3, respectively. R. 3614; 3616-20; and 
3721-24. 
II. DISPOSITION BELOW 
Charles Rehn filed a Verified Complaint against his former attorney, Steve 
Christensen, on February 15, 2013 (the "Complaint"). R. 1-109. The central allegation in 
Rehn's Complaint was that Christensen had intentionally falsified an attorney's lien, then 
recorded the false instrument against Rehn' s personal residence, and thereafter refused to 
release the lien unless Rehn paid Christensen a substantial amount of money. R. 1-22. The 
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Complaint asserted specific claims for: (a) a declaratory judgment that Christensen's Lien 
against Rehn's property was void and that Christensen's Lien should be immediately 
removed; (b) a permanent injunction against the enforcement of Christensen's Lien; (c) 
slander of title; ( d) promissory estoppel; and ( e) wrongful lien. See id. 
On February 20, 2013, Rehn filed a Combined Petition for Civil Wrongful Lien 
Injunction & Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. R. 110-
265. Shortly thereafter, the trial court entered a temporary restraining order commanding 
Christensen's Lien to be released upon Rehn's deposit of $40,000 into an escrow account 
pending resolution of the question of the Lien's validity. R. 304-8. The Parties then &,.· 
stipulated to the entry of a preliminary injunction, which the trial court entered on March 
12, 2013. R. 311-12. Christensen then filed an Answer and Counter-Complaint seeking 
enforcement of Christensen's Lien. R. 313-52. In his Counter-Complaint, Christensen 
demanded an award of attorney fees pursuant to an attorney fees provision in his 
engagement letter with Rehn. See id. 
On January 22, 2014, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Rehn on 
Rehn's declaratory judgment claim and dismissed Christensen's claim for the foreclosure 
of Christensen's Lien. R. 3617-8. This ruling mooted Rebn's claim for a permanent 
injunction. See id. The trial court dismissed Rehn's wrongful lien claim, but ruled that 
Rehn had established several elements of Rehn's slander of title claim as a matter of law, 
and that two elements of that claim involved questions of fact that required trial. Id. The 
trial court also found that Rehn's promissory estoppel claim required trial. Id. 
3 
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On December 9-10, 2014, the trial court conducted a two-day jury trjal on the two 
remaining elements of Rehn's slander of title claim. R. 3617. The Court intended to rely 
upon the same trial evidence to adjudicate Rehn' s promissory estoppel claim. The 
elements of slander of title that Rehn was required to prove at trial were: (1) that 
Christ~nsen acted with malice in recording the Lien; and (2) that Rehn had suffered 
damages in a specific amount. R. 3616. 
At the conclusion of trial, the jury found that Christensen had acted with malice and 
had caused Rehn to suffer consequential damages of $77,752.29. R. 3617. After the jury 
returned its verdict, Rehn withdrew his remaining bench trial claim for promissory estoppel 
because the damage award for that claim would have been redundant with the jury award. 
See id. After the jury trial, but before the entry of final judgment, Rehn filed his Motion 
for Award of Attorney Fees and Costs as Prevailing Party ("Rehn's Motion"). R. 3319-84. 
Rehn also filed the Declaration of Joseph E. Wrona, Rehn's counsel, in support ofRehn's 
Motion. R. 3385-3407. Briefing on Rehn's Motion concluded on January 7, 2015, and 
Rehn's Motion was submitted to the trial court that same day. R. 3611-13. 
On January 8, 2015, the trial court heard oral argument on Rehn's Motion. R. 3614-
15. At the conclusion of that hearing, the trial court denied Rehn's Motion and signed the 
Final Judgment. R. 3614. On January 21, 2015, the Court entered its Order denying Rehn's 
Motion. R. 3721-3724. On January 19, 2015, after the Court had already entered its Final 
Judgment, Christensen moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, to alter or amend 
the judgment, and for a new trial. R. 3652-3715. On February 13, 2015, the trial court 
denied Christensen's Motions. R. 3865-69. 
4 
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III. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Christensen Falsified a Lien and Recorded the Falsified Lien against 
Rehn 's Personal Residence. 
Christensen represented Rehn in a trial court divorce action from 1996 - 1997, and 
in an appeal of certain findings in the divorce action afterward. R. 44-61; 3264; 3944, 
153:9-12; 154:1-2; 154:23-156:22, 281 :23-282:3. During the divorce action, Rehn did not 
'~ 
own any real property, and the trial court in the divorce issued written findings, approved ~ 
by Christensen, stating that no real property was at issue in the divorce. R. 3944, 154:3-
13; 156:1-158:6. 
In 2000, i.e., several years after the divorce, Rehn purchased a small two-bedroom 
townhouse at 4118 Saddleback Road, Park City, Utah ("the Property"), to house himself 
and his two teenage boys. R. 63-64; 3944, 160:24-161:7; 279:22-280:10. On July 25, ~ 
2001, Christensen recorded an "Amended Notice of Attorney Lien" (the "Lien") against 
the Property. R. 3 89. Christensen still represented Rehn at the time and still owed fiduciary 
duties to Rehn at that time. At trial, Christensen testified as follows: 
Q. Okay. So when you record-when you drafted the lien more than 60 
days earlier, you obviously were still representing Mr. Rehn; correct? 
A. Right. I had not withdrawn. 
Q. So you drafted this lien while you were still under a fiduciary duty of 
undivided, impeccable honesty and loyalty to Mr. Rehn; correct? 
A. I am not disputing that I had a duty of loyalty to Mr. Rehn. 
Q. Honesty and loyalty? 
A. Honesty and loyalty. 
5 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
R. 3944, 168:10-20. Mr. Christensen also admitted that when he drafted the Lien, he also 
had a duty to be "careful and diligent." Id. at 183:15-21. 
The title of "Amended Notice of Attorney Lien" was false. Christensen conceded 
at trial that he had never recorded a prior lien against the Property, and that the Lien was 
not an "Amended Notice" of a lien. R. 389, R. 3944, 184:5-7. Christensen also falsified a 
statement in the "Amended Lien" that the Property was connected to Rehn's divorce action. 
R. 3 89. Christensen conceded at trial that Rehn did not acquire the Property until two years 
after his divorce decree was entered, and that the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
issued by the divorce court explicitly stated there was "no real property owned by the 
parties and thus no allocation is necessary." R. 5-6; 390-391; 3944, 113:15-114:4, 156:1-
158:6, 160:24-161 :7. 
Christensen also falsified the lien to make it appear that the entire principal amount 
of the lien related to divorce work performed by SSC. For instance, the Lien falsely stated 
that SSC began working for Rehn on September 29, 1995, and that Rehn agreed to pay 
SSC for the legal work performed in the divorce action. R. 389. In reality, Mary Rehn did 
not file for divorce until 1996, SSC did not exist until at least January of 1999, Rehn never 
made any agreement for services with SSC, and SSC did not perform legal services for 
Rehn prior to March of 1999. R. 391-2. 
Christensen also falsified the amount of the Lien that was related to divorce work. 
The Lien stated Rehn owed Christensen $26,807.14 for work associated with Rehn's 
divorce. R. 389._ But according to Christensen's own records, as of July 2, 2001, Rehn 
only allegedly owed Christensen $6,198.19 in relation to the trial court divorce action as 
6 
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of the date the Lien was recorded. R.. 3 93. Christensen's records also demonstrated that 
some of the legal fees owed were for legal work completely um-elated to Rehn's divorce. 
Id. 
B. Christensen Originally Recorded the Notice of the Lien without 
Notifying Rehn, and Christensen subsequently Misrepresented the 
Reason for the Lien to Rehn. 
Christensen originally recorded the Lien without alerting Rehn. R. 393-5. When 
Rehn met with Christensen two months later and told Christensen that Rehn was attempting 
to refinance his mortgage on the Property, Christensen still did not disclose that he had 
recorded the Lien against Rehn's Property. See R. 394 and 564. But shortly after that ~ 
meeting, Christensen recognized that Rehn would discover the Lien during the refinance 
process, so Christensen decided to issue a letter to Rehn to inoculate against any surprise 
discovery of the Lien by Rehn. See id. Christensen's letter to Rehn stated: 
I am told by lenders that you are able to withdraw a higher percentage of 
your equity if the money is to refinance existing obligations rather than to 
obtain cash for yourself. In the event it would be helpful, I have filed the 
enclosed attorney's lien for your use in a refinance. If it turns out that 
this lien will not be useful to you, I can release the lien. 
R. 568 ( emphasis supplied). Mr. Christensen conceded at trial that, contrary to the 
statement he made in his letter to Rehn, Christensen had actually recorded the Lien before 
Rehn met with Christensen to discuss a refinance. R. 3944, 178:4-15. Mr. Christensen 
also aclmowledged at trial that he was still representing Rehn when Christensen drafted the 
September 26, 2001 Letter and that he was still "under a fiduciary duty of loyalty and 
honesty to Mr. Rehn" when he lied to Rehn about the purpose of the Lien. Id. at 168:6-9; ~ 
177:11-13. 
7 
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C. Even after Rehn Discharged his Legal Fee Debt in a 2004 Bankruptcy, 
Christensen Refused to Release the Lien. 
On March 26, 2004, Rehn was forced to file for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection. 
R. 396. In his bankruptcy schedules, Rehn identified the entire $43,244.00 of outstanding 
attorney fees that Christensen had billed Rehn from Christensen's various law practices 
since 1996. Id. Christensen appeared at the meeting of creditors, and Christensen did not 
file any claim or objection to the banlcruptcy court's discharge ofRehn's entire $43,244.00 
legal fee debt. R. 397. On July 7, 2004, the banlcruptcy court granted Rehn a Chapter 7 
discharge of his debts, including his attorney fee debt. At trial, Christensen admitted that 
he did not release the Lien after Rehn's banlcruptcy discharge. R. 3944, 206:25-207:7; 
255:1-23. 
In December of 2012, Rehn entered into a contract to sell the Property and 
discovered that Christensen's Lien was still recorded against the Property. R. 398. Rehn 
then asked Christensen to release the Lien. Id. Christensen refused to release the Lien 
despite having promised to release the lien in his letter to Rehn eleven years earlier. Id. 
Rehn then filed this action to remove the Lien. 
D. Christensen Invoked a Contractual Right to Recover Attorney Fees in 
Defense against Rehn's claims, including Rehn's Slander of Title Claim. 
After Rehn filed suit to remove the Lien, Christensen filed an Answer & Counter-
Complaint that alleged that Rehn signed an engagement letter on October 24, 1997, 
whereby "[Rehn] agreed to pay attorney fees in the event that legal action is taken to 
enforce the agreement." R. 327-8. Christensen then went on to assert a contractual 
entitlement to recover interest, attorney fees, and costs not only for prosecuting 
8 
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Christensen's Counter-claim, but also for defending against Reh.n's claims. Christensen's 
Answer and Counter-claim stated in paragraphs 65 and 66: 
65. SSC is entitled to receive $26,807.14 plus contractual interest at the 
rate of 18% per annum ... 
66. SSC is entitled to receive attorney fees and costs .. . defending itself in 
this legal action pursuant to its contract with Rehn. 
R. 333 (emphasis supplied). The contract upon which Christensen was relying to recover 
interest, attorney fees, and costs was the Engagement Letter, and specifically language in 
the Engagement Letter that states that, 
R. 328. 
In the event legal action is taken to enforce this agreement the law of Utah 
shall apply and the prevailing party shall be entitled to reasonable costs and 
attorney's fees. 
When Christensen and SSC filed their Motion for Summary Judgment Dismissing 
Plaintiffs' Claims of Slander of Title and Promissory Estoppel and their Renewed Motion 
for Leave to Amend Answer and Counter-Complaint, (R. 1981-2287), Christensen again 
asserted that Christensen had a contractual right under the October 24, 1997, Engagement 
Letter ( the "Engagement Letter'') to record a lien against Rehn' s Property. R. 1991-1994. 
Christensen argued that because he had a contractual right to record the Lien, the Lien 
could not constitute a slander of title. Id. If Christensen had prevailed in that argument, 
Christensen would have then been entitled to seek the recovery of attorney fees on the 
ground that he had invoked the enforceability of the Engagement Letter to defect Rehn' s 
slander of title claim. 
9 
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At trial~ Christensen again argued that the Engagement Letter gave Christensen the 
contractual right to record the Lien against Rehn' s Property, and that Christensen had the 
right to invoke the enforceability of the Engagement Letter as a defense to Rehn' s slander 
of title claim. Christensen argued that the preliminary jury instructions should not state as 
fact that there was no contractual right to a lien, and that Christensen should be able to 
produce evidence about the Engagement Letter as a contract. R. 3944, 15:7-18:1. In 
Christensen's opening statement, Christensen argued that by signing the Letter, Rehn gave 
Christensen the contractual right to record a lien against Rehn's property. Id. at 131 :5-25. 
Christensen also argued that Christensen relied on the Letter. Id. at 134:21-135:2. 
Christensen further argued that the Engagement Letter not only authorized Christensen to 
record the Lien against Rehn's property, but also gave Christensen a reasonable belief that 
Christensen was justified in doing so, and thus no malice existed. Id. at 140:7-14. 
Mr. Christensen repeatedly asserted on direct examination that he had a contractual 
right to the Lien. Id. at 169:11-170:1; 174:13-17; 202:2-204:5. On cross-examination, 
Christensen continued to assert that the Engagement Letter gave him a contractual right to 
record the Lien. Id. at 220:15-221:2; 236:2-4; 242:8-243:15; 256:13-16. On re-direct, 
Christensen again asserted that the Engagement Letter gave him the contractual right to 
record the Lien. Id. at 262:4-6. On re-cross-examination, Mr. Christensen maintained that 
the Engagement Letter gave him the right to record the Lien against Rehn's property. Id. 
at 269:16-23; 270:12-15. Christensen then again argued for jury instructions that the 
parties could have entered into a contractual agreement regarding the Lien. See id. at 
313:21-318:1; 329:12-15. 
10 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
After the conclusion of evidence, and prior to closing arguments, Christensen 
repeatedly asserted that the Engagement Letter gave Christensen the right to record the 
Lien against Rehn's Property. R. 3945, 124:1-5. Christensen then asserted that the 
Engagement Letter was the basis of recording the Lien, and that the Letter gave Christensen 
the right to record a lien against Rehn's Property. R. 3945 at 183:10-23. Afterwards, 
Christensen continued to assert that the Letter allowed Christensen to record the Lien. Id. 
at 190:20-191:8. 
The jury rejected Christensen's argument and found that Christensen acted with 
malice in recording the Lien against Rehn's Home. See R. 3617. The jury concluded that ~ 
Rehn suffered $77,752.29 in damages. Id. 
A few days after the Trial Court issued its Final Judgment, the Utah Supreme Court 
issued its Dahl v. Dahl an opinion addressing Christensen's attempt to obtain $2.1 Million 
in attorney fees for a simple divorce in which the Trial Court found that Christensen was 
ineffective. See Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 23, ,r,r 198-201. The Utah Supreme Court in that 
case found that Christensen had imposed an unlawful lien on his divorce client's property 
that was in violation of the Attorneys Lien Statute and Rule 1.8 of the Utah Rules of 
Professional Conduct. See id. at ,r,r 191-197. 
E. The Trial Court's Denial ofRehn's Motion for an Award of Fees under 
Hooban. 
After the trial, Rehn moved for an award of attorney fees and costs as the prevailing 
party pursuant to Hooban v. Unicity Int'/, Inc., 2012 UT 40, and pursuant to the Court's 
equitable powers. R.3319-84. On January 8, 2015, the trial court held oral argument on 
11 
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Rehn's Motion. R. 3942. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied Relm 's 
Motion. Id. at 52 :25-53: 1. The trial court based its decision on a narrow interpretation of 
Hooban and Bilanzich v. Lonetti, 2007 UT 26. The Trial Court concluded that those cases 
only allowed a party to recover attorney fees associated with the actual prosecution of 
contract claims. See id. at 53: 10-24. The Trial Court went on to conclude that because 
Rehn's slander of title claim was a tort claim, neither party was entitled to collect attorney 
fees. Id. at 55:16-56:2. 
With regard to the Court's equitable powers to award fees, the trial court reasoned 
that such equitable powers should be "sparingly invoked." R. 3942, 56:8-10. The trial 
court then stated that Christensen's malice was not "much more egregious than any other 
claim that successfully proves malice." Id. at 56:19-22. In making its finding, the trial 
court failed to consider that Christensen, a member of the Utah bar, had slandered his own 
client's title when Christensen owed that client a fiduciary duty of honesty, loyalty, care, 
and diligence. See R. 3944, 168:10-20; 183:15-21. Thus, the trial court failed to consider 
the heightened duty and corresponding heightened repugnance of Christensen's intentional 
betrayal of his own client. See R. 3942, 57:6-9. 
On January 21, 2015, the trial court entered its Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Award of Attorney Fees and Costs as Prevailing Party that Christensen prepared (the 
"Order''). R. 3 721. The Order stated that neither party had a right to recover attorney fees 
associated with prosecuting or defending against Rehn's slander of title claim. R. 3724. 
The Order stated that attorney fees on equitable grounds are not justified because there is 
nothing in the facts of this case that distinguish it from other slander of title cases. Id. 
12 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. Rehn is entitled to his attorney fees and costs pursuant to Ur AH CODE ANN. 
§ 78B-5-826 and the Utah Supreme Court's interpretation of that statute in Hooban v. 
Unicity lntn 'I, Inc., 2012 UT 40. Christensen invoked the enforceability of his Engagement 
Letter with Rehn as a basis to recover Christensen's attorney fees and costs incurred by 
Christensen to defend against Rehn's slander of title claim. By asserting the enforceability 
of the Engagement Letter to defend against Rehn' s slander of title claim, and by asserting 
a right to recover attorney fees pursuant to an attorney fees provision in that Engagement 
Letter, Christensen triggered Rehn's right to reciprocal attorney fees pursuant to UTAH ~. 
CODE ANN. § 78B-5-826, as interpreted by the Utah Supreme Court in Hooban v. Unicity 
Intn 'l, Inc., 2012 UT 40, and its progeny. This is necessarily so because the Engagement 
Letter allowed "at least one party to recover attorney fees." See Hooban, 2012 UT 40 at ,r 
12 and R. 328. The Trial Court thus erred when it denied Rebn's Motion for Attorney 
Fees. 
II. The Trial Court erred by characterizing this case as an "average" slander of 
title case. Christensen, the attorney who represented Rehn, owed his client fiduciary duties 
of undivided honesty and loyalty, and Christensen intentionally betrayed those sworn 
duties by falsifying a lien against Rehn' s property and then 1 ying about the Lien to Rehn 
afterwards. Years later, when Rehn gave Christensen the chance to redeem himself by 
removing the Lien, Christensen refused and instead attempted to use his power as a litigator 
to force Rehn to pay the faisified amount in the Lien, with interest. These circumstances 
render Christensen's slander ofRehn's title particularly repugnant, and the trial court erred 
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by failing to consider those special circumstances when declaring Christensen's conduct to 
be "average" in a slander of title action and not worthy of an equitable award of attorney 
fees. 
III. Because Rehn is entitled to his attorney fees and costs in the underlying 
matter, Utah law entitles Rehn to an award of attorney fees and costs associated with this 
appeal concerning those attorney fees and costs. 
I. 
ANALYSIS 
UTAH LAW ENTITLES REHN TO A RECIPROCAL AWARD OF 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS. 
Christensen's assertion that the Engagement Letter gave Christensen a contractual 
right to attorney fees in defending against Rehn' s claims triggered a reciprocal right to 
attorney fees and costs under the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Hooban v. Unicity 
Intn ,l, Inc., 2012 UT 40. In Hooban, the Utah Supreme Court considered the scope of 
Section 78B-5-826, which states: 
A court may award costs and attorney fees to either party that prevails in a 
civil action based upon any promissory note, written contract, or other 
writing executed after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the promissory 
note, written contract, or other writing allow at least one party to recover 
attorney fees. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-5-826. The Hooban Court no~ed that, "The statute ~78B-5-826] 
clearly provides that it is triggered 'when the provisions' of a contract 'allow at least one 
party' to recover attorney fees."' Id. at iJ 18 (emphasis in original). The Utah Supreme 
Court also held that the statute, 
[C]onsists of a conditional if/then statement: (a) If the provisions of a written 
contract allow at least one party to ~ecover attorney fees in a civil action based 
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upon the contract, (b) then a court may award attorney fees to either party that 
prevails. 
Id. at~ 12. The Utah Supreme Court went on to declare that, "an action is 'based upon' a 
contract under the statute if a 'party to the litigation assert[ s] the writing's enforceability · 
as a basis for recovery."' Id. at~ 22. The Hooban Court ultimately concluded that, 
A party is entitled to reciprocal fee-shifting by statute 'when the provisions' 
of a contract would have entitled at least one party to recover its fees had that 
party prevailed 'in a civil action based upon' the contract. That condition is 
met in this case because, had Hooban prevailed in this suit, he would have 
been a party to the contract upon which the suit is based and would have been 
contractually entitled to attorney fees. 
Id. at iJ 32. 
The Utah Supreme Court re-affirmed its position on the reciprocity of attorney fee 
provisions in Insight Assets, Inc. v. Farias, 2013 UT 47. In Insight, the Utah Supreme 
Court quoted Hooban, and determined that had Insight prevailed on its mortgage 
foreclosure, Insight would have been entitled to attorney fees. Id. at iJ 25. 
Thus, the statutory trigger for fee shifting is met: the contract allows at least 
one party, Insight Assets, to recover attorney fees, and consequently the court 
may award attorney fees to the party that prevails in the action. 
Id. (emphasis supplied). 
In the present action, Christensen's Counter-Complaint asserted that the October 
24, 1997 Engagement Letter gave Christensen the contractual right to interest at the rate 
of "18% per annum" for any amounts not paid. R. 333. Christensen also specifically 
asserted that the Engagement Letter allowed Christensen to recover attorney fees for 
defending itself in the present action. 
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66. SSC is entitled to receive attorney fees and costs from the proceeds of 
the sale of the Saddleback Property that it incmTed in prosecuting its claims 
and defending itself in this legal action pursuant to its contract with Rehn. 
R. 333 ( emphasis supplied). Christensen filed his Counter-Claim in conjunction with filing 
his Answer, and Christensen thereafter defended against Rehn's slander of title claim on 
the ground that the Engagement Letter gave Christensen a contractual right to lien, and 
that Christensen was enforcing that contractual right when Christensen liened Rehn' s 
Residence. If Christensen had prevailed in that defense, Rehn would have been forced to 
reimburse Christensen's attorney fees and costs incurred in asserting the enforceability of 
the Engagement Letter as a defense. 
According to Hooban and its progeny, Christensen's attempt to invoke the 
enforceability of the Engagement Letter's contractual right to lien Rehn' s residence, 
combined with Christensen's demand for attorney fees pursuant to the Engagement Letter, 
should trigger the application of 78B-5-826, because the Engagement Letter allowed "at 
least one party to recover attorney fees." See Hooban, 2012 UT 40 at 112 and R. 328. If 
Christensen had prevailed, Rehn would have thereafter faced a demand for attorney fees 
from Christensen. It necessarily follows that Rehn should be entitled to a reciprocal right 
to attorney fees given that he was exposed to the threat of an adverse attorney fee award if 
Christensen h~d prevailed. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FAILING TO 
CONSIDER AN ATTORNEY'S MALICE TOWARDS HIS OWN CLIENT 
AS AN AGGRAVATING FACTOR IN CONSIDERING AN EQUITABLE 
A WARD OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS. 
An attorney who lies to his own client and undertakes malicious acts against his 
own client is guilty of a particularly repugnant act. Our system of legal representation is · 
grounded in the policy that an attorney must n~ver intentionally set out to harm his own 
client. When an attorney intentionally does so and thereafter uses his position of power to ~/ 
force his victim to spend significant legal resources to defend against that malice, the 
situation falls into that very limited category of cases that require an equitable award of 
attorney fees. There is no other way to level the playing field given the attorney's upper 
hand in the legal arena. 
There is no question that trial courts possess the power to level the playing field in <r&, 
this kind of situation. The Utah Supreme Court has declared that, 
[I]n the absence of a statutory or contractual authorization, a court has 
inherent equitable power to award reasonable attorney fees when it deems it 
appropriate in the interests of justice and equity. This power is part of the 
original authority of the chancellor to do equity in a particular situation. 
See Hughes v. Cafferty, 2004 UT 22, ,r 21 (internal citations omitted). See also Stewart v. 
Utah Pub. Serv. Comm 'n, 885 P.2d 759, 782 (Utah 1994) (same). The Hughes Court 
confirmed that "trial courts retain discretion to decide whether an award of attorney fees is 
appropriate in the interests of justice and equity in any given case." Hughes, 2004 UT 22 
at n.1 (internal citations omitted). No particular formula governs the equitable award of 
costs and fees, but trial courts must consider the specific circumstances of each situation. 
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A court acting in equity is not required to recite its decision in tem1s of 
specific factors or to adhere to fo1mulaic tests. Rather, its obligation is to 
effectuate a result that serves equity given the overall facts and 
circumstances of the individual case. 
Id. at il 24. 
In this case, a licensed1 attorney intentionally falsified a lien against his own client's 
property. The attorney then recorded the lien against his own client's property without 
notifying the client. When the attorney learned that the client was about to discover the 
existence of the lien, the attorney lied to his client about the purpose of the lien in order to 
lull the client into complacency. When this same attorney had the chance to mitigate the 
harm caused by his malice years later, the attorney chose instead to try to exhaust his former 
client in litigation in an effort to extract a pound of flesh. 
The trial court failed to consider any of these special circumstances, and instead 
summarily found that this case was no different from a run-of-the-mill slander of title case. 
The trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider and recognize that the 
circumstances of Christensen's slander of Rehn' s title constituted a repugnant breach of an 
attorney's fiduciary duty to a client and elevated the heinousness of Christensen's actions 
far beyond a 'run-of-the-mill' slander of title case. 
1 Mr. Christensen's bar license may no longer be active when this appeal is decided. The Utah Bar's Office 
of Professional Conduct has initiated an action against Mr. Christensen for transferring money belonging 
to his clients into Mr. Christensen's personal bank account so as to obtain a personal loan and failing to 
advise the lender that the funds did not belong to Mr. Christensen. See Third Dist. Court Case No. 
150902323. 
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III. REHN IS ENTITLED TO HIS ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS FOR THIS 
APPEAL. 
Rehn should be entitled to an award of his attorney fees and costs for this appeal. It 
is well settled in Utah that where there is an entitlement to attorney fees and costs below, 
there exists an entitlement to attorney fees on appeal. See Federated Capital Corp. v. 
Haner, 2015 UT App 132, ~ 11. This Court has recently stated that, "Utah appellate courts 
have 'interpreted attorney fee statutes broadly so as to award attorney fees on appeal where ~ 
a statute initially authorizes them."' Pepperwood HOA v. Mitchell, 2015 UT App 137, ~ 
13 (quoting Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 319 (Utah 1998)). Here, Utah's fee-
shifting statute, as interpreted by Hooban and its progeny, entitle Rehn to an award of 
attorney fees. Thus, pursuant to the broad interpretation of attorney fee statutes in Utah, 
Rehn is also entitled to the attorney fees regarding this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should reverse: (1) the trial court's denial of an 
award of attorney fees to Rehn; (2) order the trial court to award Rehn his attorney fees 
incurred in prevailing against Christensen's wrongful attempt to enforce the Engagement 
Letter's right to lien provision; and (3) direct the trial court to award Rehn his attorney fees 
incurred in this appeal. 
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® 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Rehn respectfully requests oral argument on this appeal. 
DATED this 28th day.of September, 2015. 
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WRONA GORDON & DUBOIS, P.C. 
Joseph E.Wrona 
Jared C. Bowman 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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Utah Code ~ 
788-5-826 Attorney fees -- Reciprocal rights to recover attorney fees. 
A court may award costs and attorney fees to either party that prevails in a civil action based 
upon any promissory note, written contract, or other writing executed after April 28, 1986, when 
the provisions of the promissory note, written contract, or other writing allow at least one party to ~· 
recover attorney fees. 
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session 
Page 1 
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wrona@wgdlawfirm.com 
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bowman@wgdlawfirm.com 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT • SUMMIT 
· JAN - ·a 2015 \ ,.\ \.p t\· \'1'1 • 
FILEDBV bih7 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHARLES C. REHN, an individual; and 
that certain real property located at 4118 
SADDLEBACKROAD, PARK CITY, 
UTAH 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
STEVES. CHRISTENSEN, an individual; 
STEVES. CHRISTENSEN, P.C., a Utah 
professional corporation; HENROID, 
· NIELSEN, & CHRISTENSEN, a Utah 
general partnership; CHRISTENSEN, 
CORBEIT & PANKRATZ, PLLC, a Utah 
professional limited liability company; · 
HIRSCHI CBRIS.TENSEN, PLLC, a Utah 
professional limited liability company; and 
ALL UNKNOWN PERSONS WHO· 
CLAIMANYINTEBESTIN THE 
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE ACTION. 
Ii I Defendants. 
i I ·, 
FINAL JUDGMENT 
Case No. 130500115 
The Honorable Ryan M. Harris 
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This matter came before the Court for a jury trial on December 9-10, 2014, with David 
M. Corbett of Christensen, Corbett & Pankratz, PL~C representing Defendant Steve S. 
Christensen ("Christensen") and Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff Steve S. Christensen, P.C. 
C'SSC''• and Joseph B. Wrona of Wrona, Gordon & DuBois, P.C. representing Plaintiff Charles 
C. Rehn ("Rehn") and Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant 4118 Saddleback Road, Park City, Utah 
(the "Property") (collectively, the "Plaintiffs"). On December 9-10, 2014 the Parties 1ried the 
following issues to a jury: ( l) whether Christensen and SSC acted with malice when they 
recorded the Amended Notice of Attomey Lien, Entry No. 00594032, Bk. 01384, Pg. 00187 on 
July 25, 2001(the "Lien") against the Property; and (2) whether the Plaintiffs suffered damages, 
end in what amount Prior to trial, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs 
on the -Plaintiffs' cause of action for declaratory judgment, which the Court construed as a quiet 
! 
title action and deemed the Plaintiffs• cause of action for an iajunction moot Prior to trial, the 
Court also found that the Plaintiffs had established the first two elements of their Slander of Title 
claim as .a matter of law. Prior to trlal, the Court further dismissed the Plaintiffs' claim for 
wrongful lien as being outside the statute of limitations. 
·. • ,I I 
On December 10, 2014, the jury in this action found that Christensen and SSC acted with 
malice and the jmy awarded $77,752.29 in consequential ~ges .. In the wake of that jmy 
verdict, 1he Plaintiffs withdrew their promissory estoppel claim in order to conserve the 
resources of the Court and the Parties. 
,j 
2 
. ! . ~ 
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ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Based upon the :findings and conclusions of the Comt and the Jury, THE COURT 
HEREBY ORDERS, ADnJDGES, AND DECREES TIIAT: 
. 1. The Plaintiffs' First Cause of Action (Declaratory Judgment against All . 
Defendants) was proven as a matter of law on January 22, 2014. 
2. The Plaintiffs• Second Cause of Action (Permanent Injunction against All 
Defendants) was dismissed with prejudice as moot on January 22, 2014. 
3. The Plaintiffs' Third Cause of Action (Sland~ of Title against Christensen and 
SSC) bas been proven by a preponderance of the evidence. 
4. The Plaintiffs' Fourth Cause of Action (Promiss9ry Estoppel against Christensen 
and SSC) bas been withdrawn. 
~. The Plaintiffs' Fifth Cause of Action (Wrongful Lien against Chrls~en and 
SSC) was dismissed as a matter oflaw on January 22, 2014. 
6. SSC's First -cause of Action (Enforcement of Lien Against the Saddleback 
Property) was dismissed as a matter of law on January 22, 2014 . 
. ~-- .. 
7. The Court therefore grants relief and money damages to the Plaintiffs on their 
Slander of Title Claim against Christensen and SSC in the following amounts: 
a. $77,752.29, representing the special damages of attorney's fees and costs that 
Rehn paid to remove the cloud placed on his title by the Lien; 
b. Post-Judgment Interest at the rate of I!&% per annum; and 
!. . 2.277, 
3@ 
I. 
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c.... A deitiesal Geats mtd ttlteftttry fees as the · prevailittg pm-ey in the amettnt of 9-
s~.=-..=-..::-.:.:s-0- @ 
8. The total_ amount of the monetaty j~ent awarded to Rehn is $77,752.~ pm&- @ 
.th~ ~dditiellftl eests and atf:omcys' fees to in the amocmt of $ _____ for tt?tftl ft'WaM of ~ 
$. . 
~ 9. The total award shall a~e interest from the date of this Final Judgment at the 
~ 2:za-·/. 
rate of~~ annum. . 
1.0. -nu'~ Fa'-ul.l .:lJ4½~+ 1' l #-.L h'-1A.I ord.u- or 1kt. ecvrl ··~ -/1,u'l ~'Lrc., 
DATEDthis 8""dayof :r~ , wrs-. 41\.J '\D _lvr-fh.u ortl.v JJ 
~"'~- €fl) BY THE COURT: 
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David M. Corbett (U.S.B. No. 13946) 
dmc@ccplawyers.com 
Craig L. Pankratz (U.S.B. No. 12194) 
Christensen Corbett & Pankratz, pllc 
340 East 400 South 
Salt La~e City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 303-5800 
,,,•(: .·_: .. ·:. ' i·;~·-. 
The Order of Court is stated below: / · ./}Cf,\ \ 
Dated: January 21, 2015 Isl RYAN\fi-j. 1-
12:25: 12 PM Districf\C9\[Jf~~i~e/ 
·<::,:;1·i,_ ... ,-::>··' 
Attorneys for Steve S. Christensen, Steve S. Christensen, P.C., Christensen Corbett & Pankratz, 
P LLC, and Hirschi Christensen, P LLC 
In The Third Judicial District Court in and for 
Summit County, State of Utah 
CHARLES C. REHN, an individual; and 
that certain real property located at 4118 
SADDLEBACK ROAD, PARK CITY, 
UTAH 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
STEVE S. CIIlUSTENSEN, an individual; 
STEVES. CHRISTENSEN, P.C., a Utah 
professional corporation; HENROID, 
NIELSEN, & CHRISTENSEN, a Utah 
general partnership; CHRISTENSEN, 
CORBETT & PANKRATZ, PLLC, a Utah 
professional limited liability company; 
HIRSCffi CIIlUSTENSEN, PLLC, a Utah 
professional limited liability company; and 
ALL UNKNOWN PERSONS WHO 
CLAIM: ANY INTEREST IN THE 
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE ACTION. 
Defendants. 
s 
Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Award of Attorney Fees and Costs as 
Prevailing Party 
Civil No. 130500115 
Judge Ryan Harris 
This matter came before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion for Award of Attorney Fees and Costs as 
Prevailing Party. The Court held a hearing on January 8, 2015 to discuss the motion. Plaintiffs were 
represented by Joesph Wrona, and Defendants were represented by David Corbett. Plaintiffs 
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asserted three grounds for an award of attorney fees: (1) through the retainer agreement between Mr. 
Rehn and Mr. Christensen and his law firm; (2) by virtue of Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-5-826; and (3) 
through the Court's inherent equitable powers. to award attorney fees when required by justice. 
Having received the arguments of the parties, and finding itself fully advised of the premises, the 
Courfmakes the following ruling: 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
I. On October 24, 1997, Charles Rehn ("Rehn") signed a retainer agreement ("1997 Retainer") 
with Henriod, Nielsen & Christensen ("HNC"). Paragraph 15 of the retainer agreement 
stated, "In the event legal action is taken to enforce this agreement the law of Utah shall 
apply and the prevailing party shall be entitled to reasonable c_osts and attorney's fees." 
2. Plaintiffs filed their Verified Complaint on February 15, 2013. The complaint asserted five 
causes of action: (1) A declaratory judgment seeking a judgment that the lien w~ 
unenforceable and void ab initio; (2) A permanent injunction prohibiting efforts to enforce 
the lien; (3) Slander of Title; (4) Estoppel; and (5) Wrongful Lien. 
3. In their counter-complaint, Defendants sought enforcement of the lien. Defendants cited to 
the 1997 Retainer as the basis for the amounts owed and in support of their claim that Rehn 
had consented to the lien against his property. The counter-complaint included a request for 
attorney fees in prosecuting and defending the matter pursuant to the 1997 Retainer. 
4. On January 22, 2014, the Court entered its Order on Summary Judgment Motions. The Court 
granted summary judgment to Plaintiff on his first cause of action ( declaratory judgment) 
and determined that the second cause of action (injunctive relief) was moot. The Court 
denied summary judgment to either party on the slander of title cause of action because of 
· the factual issues related to Defendants' intent when the lien was recorded. The Court denied 
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summary judgment on the estoppel cause of action because of factual issues. And the Court 
dismissed the Wrongful Lien cause of action. Finally, the Court dismissed Defendants' 
counterclaim. 
5. The parties then proceeded to trial on the Slander of Title and Estoppel causes of action. 
However, after trial concluded, Plaintiffs' withdrew their Estoppel claims. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Generally, attorney fees are awarded only if authorized by statute or contract. Eldridge v. 
Farnsworth, 2001 UT App. 243, ,r 51, 166 P.3d 639. A party may recover attorney fees 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-82~ where that party prevails in a civil action based upon a 
promissory note, written contract, or other writing executed after April 28, 1986, which 
writing contains an attorneys' fee provision that allows at least one party to recover attorneys' 
fees. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826. As described by the Utah Supreme Court, "an action is 
'based upon' a contract under the statute if a 'party to the litigation assert[ s] the writing 
enforceability as basis for recovery." Hooban v. Unicity lnten., Inc., 2012 UT 40, 'u 22,285 
P.3d 766 (citing Bilanzich v. Lonetti, 2007 UT 26, ,r 15, 160 P.3d 1041). If provided by 
contract, they can only be awarded in "in strict accordance with the terms of the contract." 
Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah 1998). For this reason, a trial court must separate. fees 
related to contractual claims from those fees related to other claims "for which there is no 
entitlement for attorney fees." Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266, 269-70 (Utah 
1992). 
2. The language of the contract in quest~on only allowed a party to recover attorney fees in a 
legal action brought to enforce the terms of the contract. The slander of title claim was not 
brought to enforce the terms of the contract and was not otherwise based upon the contract. 
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Neither party had a contractual right to recover attorney fees associated with prosecuting or 
defending against the slander of title claim. Therefore, Plaintiffs cannot recover any fees for 
their prosecution for the slander of title cause of action pursuant to the contract or Utah Code 
Ann.§ 78B-5-826. 
3. A court may, however, exercise its inherent authority to award attorney fees where it is 
appropriate in the interest of justice and equity. The Court, however, declines to exercise its 
equitable powers in this case. Although the jury found that the Defendants acted with malice 
when they recorded the subject lien, the Court does not find that the facts of this case 
distinguish it from other slander of title cases such that justice requires an award of attorney 
fees in addition to those already awarded by the jury, which the jury determined to be 
reasonably necessary to remove the cloud of title from Mr. Rehn's property. Absent such 
facts to distinguish this case from other slander of title of case, Plaintiffs argument would 
allow a party to recover all attorney fees in every slander of title case. The Court is not 
willing to exercise its discretion in that manner. 
Wherefore, premises considered, and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED 
that Plaintiff's Motion for Award of Attorney Fees and Costs as Prevailing Party is denied. 
This order is signed and entered of record as indicated on the top of the first page. 
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